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Comments and Casenotes
Harassing Tactics Not Per Se A Breach Of
The Duty To Bargain Collectively
N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents' International Union.1
After the defendant union and the company had nego-
tiated for more than a month, hoping to agree on a con-
tract to replace an agreement affecting the company's
insurance agents in thirty-five states and the District
of Columbia, the union announced that, if "agreement" on
the terms of the new contract was not reached by the
time the old contract expired, the union members would
participate in a work-without-contract program designed
to harass the company. When the old contract expired,
the union and company remained at the bargaining table,
but true to its word, the union launched its program of
harassment which consisted primarily of slow-down
tactics and uncooperative action.2 The company filed a
charge of refusal to bargain collectively against the union
based on the work-without-contract program. The Trial
Examiner recommended a dismissal of the action on the
basis of Textile Workers Union v. N.L.R.B.5 The N.L.R.B.
rejected this recommendation and granted a cease and
desist order, ruling that, regardless of the union's good
faith at the bargaining table, its tactics during the course
of the negotiations constituted, per se, violation of the duty
to bargain collectively.' The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia denied enforcement and set aside the
cease and desist order.'
1361 U.S. 477 (1960).
2The harassment consisted of a refusal for a time to solicit new busi-
ness, refusal to comply with the company's reporting procedures, refusal
to participate in the company's "May Policyholders' Month Campaign,"
reporting late to district offices, engaging in "sit-in" mornings, absenting
themselves from special business conferences arranged by the company,
and distributing anti-company leaflets while picketing.
22T F. 2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955). In the Tertile Workers case the
Board ruled that harassing tactics by a union during negotiations were per Be
a refusal to bargain collectively in good faith. The Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia denied enforcement of the Board's cease and
desist order over the strong dissent of Judge Danaker, who believed
"the union actions were designed to unilaterally change working condi-
tions" and were therefore a per se breach of the duty to bargain in good
faith. Id., 412. See infra, ns. 21-22, 26-28, and the text thereto.
'119 N.L.R.'B. 768 (1957), quoted in 361 U.S. 477, 482 (1960).
5260 F. 2d 736 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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On certiorari, the Supreme Court by a 6-3 opinion, Mr.
Justice Brennan, affirmed the Court of Appeals. The
Court viewed the "Board's approach" as an "intrusion"
into the substantive aspects of the bargaining process and
held that the Board exceeded its authority by inferring a
lack of good faith "solely and simply" because economic
pressure tactics were employed during the course of ne-
gotiations. 6 In a separate opinion Mr. Justice Frankfurter,
joined by Justices Harlan and Whittaker, condemned the
Board's per se approach 7 but urged that the case be re-
manded to the Board for a finding based on the totality of
circumstances surrounding the bargaining situation.'
When the National Labor Relations Act was passed in
1935, it placed upon the employer the duty to bargain
collectively with the recognized bargaining agent of his
employees.' This Act neither defined what comprised
"bargaining collectively" nor placed a corresponding duty
on the labor unions. The National Labor Relations Board,
set up under the Act, was left with the problem of deter-
mining what comprised a breach of the employer's duty to
bargain." The Board gleaned from the legislative pro-
ceedings that bargaining collectively meant "to recognize
and deal in good faith"" with labor's representatives.
Thus, in the early days of the Wagner Act, the N.L.R.B.
and the courts 2 on review of Board decisions adopted the
concept of bargaining in good faith as a method of sepa-
rating employers who used the negotiations not to reach
agreement but to stall settlement in hopes of breaking the
1 Mr. Justice Brennan stated, supra, n. 1, 490:
"1... the limitations on -Board power ... are exceeded . . . by inferring
a lack of good faith not from any deficiencies of the union's per-
formance at the bargaining table by reason of its attempted use of
economic pressure, but solely and simply because tactics designed to
exert economic pressure were employed during the course of good
faith negotiations."
'361 U.S. 477, 508 (1960).
8 Id., 514.9 National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(5), 49 STAT. 449, 453
(1935).
10,Smith, The Bvolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American
Law, 39 Mich. L. Rev. 1065, 1089 (1941), states:
"... Congress which made the duty to bargain explicit for most
employers did not make a substantial contribution to its meaning.
That task was left to the new Labor Board and to the courts."
179 Cong. Rec. 7571 (1935) (remarks of Senator Wagner) :
"d... the right [of labor] to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing must be matched by the corelative
duty of employers to recognize and deal in good faith with these
representatives." (Emphasis added).
See also 79 Cong. Rec. 9685, 9711 (1935).
12 Singer Mfg. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 119 F. 2d 131 (Tth Cir. 1941); Globe
Cotton Mills v. N.L.R.B., 103 F. 2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939).
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union, from employers who were dealing honestly but
sternly with a union.13
When Congress amended the National Labor Relations
Act through the Taft-Hartley legislation, the duty to bar-
gain collectively was placed on both the union and the
employer14 and defined in terms of good faith.15 Taft-
Hartley was finally passed after Congress had defeated an
attempt by the House Committee on Education and Labor
to stereotype the bargaining process through setting pro-
cedural requirements6 which would have replaced the
Board's determinations of good faith.17
Good faith is a subjective requirement referring to a
state of mind, and, absent a declaration of intent by a party,
a lack of good faith must be inferred from the party's
conduct. Prior to the enactment of Taft-Hartley there had
developed a tendency on the part of the Board-, with
judicial approval on review, to make per se violations of
the duty to bargain collectively out of items of evidence
tending to prove a lack of good faith.'8 When using this
per se test, the Board focuses its attention on a single
See Cox, Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term,
1957, 44 Va. L. Rev. 1057, 1079 (1958).
"Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §§ 8(a)(5),
8(b) (3), 8 (d) ; 61 STAT. 136, 141, 142 (1947) ; 29 U.S.C.A. §§158(a) (5),
(b) (3), (d) (1956).
'5Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(d); 61
STAT. 136, 142 (1947) ; 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (1956) :
"For the purposes 'of this section, to bargain collectively is the
performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and the repre-
sentatives of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer
in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment, or the negotiations of an agreement, or
any question arising (thereunder, and the execution of a written
contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either
party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a
proposal or require the making of a concession. . . ." (Emphasis
added).
'
8 H.R. 3020, 80th Oong,, 1st Seiss., § 2 (11) (1946).
"H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st ,Sess., 20 (1946):
"... the committee has deemed it wise to define collective bargain-
ing. . . This bill does this in two ways: first, it sets up objective
standards by which the Board can determine whether or not a party
has refused to bargain. . . . The Chairman of the Board has stated
that whether or not a person is bargaining 'in good faith' requires
apprising his 'state of mind.' The possibility of error and injustice
when three Board members, none of whom -are psychiatrists, under-
take to do this is very great .... "
The bill reported by the House Committee, with the above comment,
was amended on the floor of Congress and the Act, as finally passed,
contained no provision comparable to § 2 (11) of H.R. 3020, supra, n. 16.
The quoted passage from the House Committee Report referred to § 2 (11).
See H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., Minority Report, 69-70 (1946),
for a blunt attack on § 2 (11).
"Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401, 1422
(1958).
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act of a party to the bargaining process and declares that
act to be determinative of a lack of good faith on the part
of the actor.
This approach has been applied in three situations:
(1) where the employer refuses to sign a contract em-
bodying the terms agreed upon;2" (2) where wage increases
or other permanent changes in hours or working condi-
tions, beyond what is offered to the union representative
at the bargaining table,2 are granted directly to the em-
ployees by the employer's unilateral action;22 and (3)
where the employer fails to grant information relating to
the statutory subjects of bargaining after claiming in-
ability to meet union demands.23
The per se approach is explicable and valid in the three
mentioned areas. Refusal to embody the terms of an
agreement into a writing not only deprives the union of a
symbol2 4 of its achievement at the bargaining table, but
the bad faith of such a refusal can be seen when the
analogy is drawn between a refusal of an employer to
consent to a writing of his agreement with labor and a
situation in which a business man enters into negotiations
with another entrepreneur for an agreement having nu-
merous provisions with the reservation that he will not
reduce it to a writing or sign it. In neither case would
there be bargaining in good faith.25
Unilateral changes in the conditions of employment
yield to much the same analysis. Where an employer, for
example, grants directly to the employees a unilateral
wage increase of a higher amount "6 than, offered to the
19Id., 1422-1428; Feinsinger, The National Labor Relations Act and
Collective Bargaining, 57 Mich. L. Rev. 806, 812 et seq. (1959).
1H. J. Heinz Co. v. N.L.R.B., 311 U.S. 514 (1941). This holding was
embodied in § 8(d) of Taft-Hartley Act, supra, n. 15.
"1A unilateral grant extending to employees what had been offered
at the bargaining itable, even though it did not fully meet union demands
and negotiations were continuing on what was not settled, was not a
per se violation. N.L.R.B. v. Bradley Washfountain Co., 192 F. 2d 144
(7th Cir. 1951). See also Bowman, An Employer's Unilateral Action -
An Unfair Labor Practice?, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 487, 500 (1956).
"N.L.R.B. v. Crompton, Mills, 337 U.S. 217 (1949); May Stores, Co. v.
N.L.R.B., 326 U.S. 376 (1945); Medo Oorp. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 678
(1944); N.L.R.B. v. F. M. Reeves and Sons, Inc., 273 F. 2d 710 (10th
Cir. 1959); Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co. v. N.L.R.B., 216 F. 2d 273 (9th
Cir. 1954); Armstrong Cork Co. v. N.L.R.B., 211 F. 2d 843 (5th Cir.
1954) ; Great Southern Trucking Co. v. N.L.R.B., 127 F. 2d 180 (4th Cir.
1942).
0N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); Taylor Forge &
Pipe Works v. N.L.R.B., 234 F 2d 227 (7th Cir. 1956).
"Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401, 1423
(1958).




union at the bargaining table, this conduct has two rele-
vant effects. First, it casts aspersions on the worth of
union membership and collective bargaining by telling the
employees that without either they can secure greater
advantages.2 7 Second, since Section 8(d) of Taft-Hartley
expressly requires bargaining on "wages, hours and other
conditions of employment, '28 the unilateral grant of one
of these subjects effectively places that subject beyond the
realm of collective bargaining, and violates the duty to
bargain.
A refusal to give information to the union as a per se
refusal to bargain has been justified by referring to the
statutory requirement of bargaining on "wages, hours and
other conditions of employment" and reasoning that:
"... there could be no negotiations on the subject...
until the information was supplied to the union. And
since there was no bargaining on the statutory sub-
ject, the N.L.R.B. was not required to review the
conduct of negotiations. '"29
There simply was no bargaining, and therefore "neither
the manner in which the negotiations were conducted nor
the employer's state of mind was in issue." °
While the per se approach is explicable in regard to
areas in which it has been accorded applicability, cases
within the categories are not always decided by reference
to that approach. 31 Within the three areas the Supreme
Court has not yielded to the per se approach without
dissent;12 and, expansion of the doctrine to different sit-
uations has been thwarted by the general rule that good
faith is a subjective requirement to be ascertained by
appraising the entire bargaining situation and not by
focusing on a single act without reference to the other
circumstances of the bargaining situation.33
Supra, n. 24.
2 Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(d); 61
STAT. 136, 142 (1947) ; 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (1956).
2 Supra, n. 24, 1428.
3DIbid.
81N.L.R.B. v. Herman Sausage Co., 275 F. 2d 229, 234 (5th Cir. 1960);
N.L.R.B. v. Stanislaus Imp. & H. Co., 226 F. 2d 377, 381 (9th Cir. 1955).
" See Frankfurter, J., dissenting, N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S.
149, 155, 157 (1956).
IN.L.R.B. v. Virginia Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 477 (1941). See also
N.L.R.B. v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 92 (1957); N.L.R.B. v.
American Insurance Co., 343 U.S. 395, 409 (1952) ; Quaker State Oil
Refining Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 270 F. 2d 40 (3rd Cir. 1959) ; N.L.R.B. v.
I.B.S. Mfg. Co., 210 F. 2d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1954); N.L.R.B. v. National
Shoes, 208 F. 2d 688, 692 (2nd Cir. 1953).
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The central question presented by the Insurance
Agents' Union case34 was whether the Board had properly
applied the per se test to the union's work-without-contract
tactics, which admittedly did not fit any of the three
pigeonholes fashioned by the courts for that approach.
The Supreme Court, although dividing on the proper mode
of dispensing with the case, unanimously rejected the
Board's per se approach to this case. 5
The majority condemned the Board's per se deter-
mination of a lack of good faith by rejecting the Board's
claim that it had the power to distinguish among various
economic pressure tactics and brand the ones at bar per se
inconsistent with good faith collective bargaining. 6 The
majority felt that there is no inconsistency between the
application of economic pressure and good faith bargain-
ing,3" and that to uphold the Board's contention would be
to allow "the Board's entrance into the substantive as-
pects of the bargaining process to an extent Congress had
not countenanced."3 The Court, however, was careful to
84 Supra, n. 1.
361 U.S. 477, 490-491, 508 (1960).
Commentators on the labor scene, supra, ns. 18-19, have expressed a
fear that an expansion of the per se test could lead to the establishment
of a set of "good bargaining practices," a requirement, they felt, over and
above the statutory command of bargaining collectively as defined in terms
of conferring In good faith. The comments were sparked by three decisions:
Textile Workers Union v. N.L.R.B., 227 F. 2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1955);
N.L.R.B. v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149 (1956); N.L.R.B. v. Borg-
Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). For a summary of Textile Workers
case, see supra, n. 3. Truitt ruled that an employer had to justify by
proof his claim that a wage increase was beyond his economic position
to grant. Borg-Warner held that, while there was no bad faith on either
side, the insistence that certain terms (that were beyond the scope of
mandatory subjects of bargaining) be included in the agreement, was a
refusal to bargain. Justices Harlan, Clark and Whittaker, concurring in
'Borg-Warner could not grasp "a concept of 'bargaining' which enables one
to 'propose' a particular point, but not to 'Insist' on It as a condition to
agreement. The right to bargain becomes illusory if one is not free to press
a proposal in good faith to the point of insistence." 356 U.S. 342, 352
(1958).
The face of the majority's opinion in N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents'
Union, supra, n. 1, reveals awareness of the critical law review articles.
Professor (now Solicitor-General) Cox is termed "a close student of our
national labor relations laws." 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960). His article,
supra, n. 18, was cited at three separate junctures by the majority.
1, Supra, n. 35, 494-5.
88 Supra, n. 35, 498. The Court's fear of the Board's intrusion into the
substantive aspects of collective bargaining is reflected in this statement:
"... if the Board could regulate the choice of economic weapons that
may be used as part of collective bargaining, it would be in a
position to exercise considerable influence upon the substantive terms
on which the parties contract. As the parties' own devices became
more limited, the Government might have to enter even more di-
rectly into the negotiation of collective agreements. Our labor policy
is not presently erected on a foundation of government control of the
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
point out that it did "not mean to question in any way' '9
the Board's power to determine whether a party's conduct
at the bargaining table evidences a real desire to come
into agreement by "drawing inferences from the conduct
of the parties as a whole."4
Justices Frankfurter, Harlan and Whittaker accused the
majority of withdrawing the harassing tactics from the
totality of circumstances so that:
".. . no evidentiary significance, not even an inference
of lack of good faith, is allowed to be drawn from the
conduct in question as part of a total context."'"
The mere fact, they argued, that one engaged in tactics
designed to exert economic pressure does not preclude the
Board from considering such conduct, in the totality of
circumstances, as evidence of the actual state of mind of
the actor.42 These Justices would have remanded the case
to the Board for further opportunity to introduce pertinent
evidence of the union's lack of good faith. It is difficult
to understand what purpose a remand would serve, be-
cause in this particular case the Board's General Counsel
had repeatedly declined the opportunity, afforded by the
Trial Examiner, to present any evidence of failure to bar-
gain in good faith other than the harassing tactics. 44
While the Court unanimously rejected the per se ap-
proach in this case, the majority recognized the validity of
the test in at least one of its restricted areas. Speaking
in a footnote,45 the Court asserted "an employer's uni-
lateral setting of employment terms during the collective
bargaining may amount to a breach of its duty to bargain
collectively." One must recognize that "may amount"
hardly conveys the conclusiveness of former opinions in
that area.46
This same footnote also raises the question whether
union conduct could be treated, analogously to employer
results of negotiations. . . . Nor does it contain -a charter for 'the
National Labor Relations Board to act at large in equalizing dis-
parities of bargaining power between employer and union." (490).
- 361 U.S. 477, 498 (1961).
40 Ibid.
"I Supra, n. 39, 504.
2Supra, n. 39, 505.
' Supra, n. 39, 514.
" Supra, n. 39, 481, fn. 4.
Supra, n. 39, 496-497, fn. 28.
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his separate opinion by implication denied
that the Court ever accepted the Board's per se test when he distinguished
away the four cases cited to him in the instant case as supporting the
per se approach. 361 U.S. 477, 508-510 (1961).
[VOL. XXI
N.L.R.B. v. INS. AGENTS' UNION
conduct, as unilaterally establishing working conditions,
and, as such, amount to a failure to bargain collectively in
good faith.47 Because this situation, which was hypo-
thetically suggested as arising where a union demanding a
35 hour week simply refused to work more than 35 hours,
was not presented in the Insurance Agents' Union case,
the question was left open.48  By referring to the Con-
gressional intent relating to the collective bargaining legis-
lation (as the Court did in Insurance Agents' Union), an
answer may be suggested. Each step in the legislative
process relative to the enactment of Taft-Hartley displays
an intent to demand the same bargaining posture of both
union and employer. 49 This intent was reflected in the Act
as finally passed, which placed a mutual duty to bargain
collectively upon both union and employer, 0 making their
obligations "corresponding."' '51 If this supposedly corre-
sponding duty would be interpreted to allow a union to
unilaterally establish working conditions while denying to
the employer a similar prerogative,52 the duty would hardly
be corresponding. Furthermore, unilateral action effec-
tively avoids collective bargaining and thereby the statute
which seeks to promote it as national policy.55
If, in some future given situation, a union should
resort to harassing tactics, while remaining at the bargain-
ing table and delivering no ultimatums and evidencing a
reasonable effort to reach agreement, and the employer
should react by staying at the bargaining table with a
Supra, circa ns. 20-28.
The hypothetical question posed by the Court was suggested by Note,
Union Refusal to Bargain, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 502, 509 (1958).
9 The mutual obligation was demanded and endorsed before The House
Committee on Education and Labor by impartial observers (e.g., Dr.
Harold Metz, representing Brookings Institution, Hearings Before The
House Committee on Education and Labor on Amendment to the National
Labor Relations Act, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 227 (1946)) and by employer-
oriented witnesses (e.g., Roland Rice, General Counsel American Trucking
Association, Inc., id., 584). The "one-sided" character of the Wagner Act
was castigated by the iSenate Committee as destructive of the equality of
bargaining power necessary to maintain industrial peace because it
"afford(ed) relief to employees and labor organizations for certain un-
desirable practices on the part of management [while denying] to manage-
ment any redress for equally undesirable actions on the part of labor
organizations." S. Rep., No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1946).
'Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(d) ; 61
STAT. 136, 142 (1947) ; 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(d) (1956).
51 MLIS AND 'BROwN, FROM WAGNRiR ACT TO TAr'r-HARTLEY (1950) 448.
5 Supra, circa ns. 26-28.




similar attitude, but exercising its prerogative of firing 4
or locking-out" those engaged in the harassment, or ap-
plying counter-harassment tactics,56 the collective bargain-
ing required by Insurance Agents' Union would be met.
In such a situation the tactics used outside the conference
room would not preclude a sincere desire to reach agree-
ment at the bargaining table. The statutory requirement of




Testator by will, which was probated in 1913, left his
estate in trust for his son Ernest Clarke for life and
"from and after the death of my son * * * then to his
issue, absolutely."2 Ernest Clarke died in 1958 and was
survived by two sons: Thomas with no children, and
Robert Fulton with one child - Robert Fulton Clarke, Jr.,
an infant.' When the trust estate was ready for dis-
- 361 U.S. 477, 492-95 (1961). The firing of the employees engaged in
unprotected activities as an alternative to seeking a cease and desist
order on a charge of unfair labor practice, as was attempted without
success in the principal case, may be a self-defeating and unusuable sub-
stitute, especially where the employees involved are skilled tradesmen,
who would be difficult to replace if fired, or where the employees in the
field are highly organized and would not accept the job opened by a
firing arising out of a labor dispute.
1N.L.R.B. v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 92 (1957), found that
an employer lockout was not per se unlawful, and was under the facts of
that case a legitimate employer weapon.
9 A possible argument for a parity of economic weapons is provided by
the legislative intent of Taft-Hartley which aimed at erasing the "one-
sided" character of bargaining that existed under the Wagner Act. S. Rep.
No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1946). However, management would have
to take care not to commit a per se unfair labor practice by unilaterally
changing working conditions. Supra, circa n. 22.
The separate opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter urged:
"... interpretations of the Act ought not to proceed on the assumption
that it actively throws its weight on the side of unionism in order
to redress an assumed inequality of bargaining power." 360 U.S. 477,
507 (1960).
'222 Md. 153, 159 A. 2d 362 (1960).
'Id., 155.
'In 1950, while the life tenant was still living, the infant by his mother
(the divorced wife of Robert Fulton Clarke), brought suit for a declara-
tion of his interest in the trust, for an 'accounting by the trustee and
for protection against dissipation of the estate. The court held that
"issue" meant all descendants and the infant had a potential future
Interest in the corpus but all other questions including distribution were
"reserved for future determination as the need may arise." See In re
Clarke's Will, 198 Md. 266, 274, 81 A. 2d 640 (1951).
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